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Abstract: This study contributes to the current body of entrepreneurial finance literature by analyzing 
multiple aspects of personal guarantees. We conducted a survey yielding 1,462 responses from owners 
or managers of incorporated small businesses geographically dispersed throughout the United States. 
Of these, 383 C or S corporations had loans in place during 2014. The survey focuses on personal 
guarantees used on five types of loans: lines of credit, mortgages, equipment loans, vehicle loans, and 
a loan type referred to as "other loans." We found the variation increase in personal guarantees for 
equipment loans, vehicle loans, and other types of loans during the 27 years (1987 – 2014) to be 
significant with a 95% confidence level, with a 5% margin of error. We found an underinvestment 
problem (Ang, Lin & Tyler, 1995) exists as 12.5% of owners of incorporated small businesses have 
decided not to undertake a positive net present value project because the lender required a personal 
guarantee to obtain a loan for the project. We found lenders denied 10.9% of these 383 corporations 
a loan resulting in credit rationing because of these corporations' inability to meet the lender's personal 
guarantee requirements. We found more than 15% of the 383 corporation owners refused the lender's 
requirement to provide a personal guarantee. Almost 42% of the 15% still received a loan from the 
same lender after refusing to provide a personal guarantee. We found that only 22.2% of female small-
incorporated business owners received a loan after refusing to provide a personal guarantee from the 
same lender. Compared to 51.4% of the male small incorporated business owners still received the 
loan after refusing to provide a personal guarantee. Overall, we found that only 37% of the 1,462 
incorporated small business respondents had a loan in place during 2014 compared to 67% of 
incorporated businesses documented by the Federal Reserve Board's 1987 National Survey of Small 
Business Finances.  
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1. Introduction 
 
A personal guarantee places all personal assets and future earnings of the incorporated small 
business owner at risk in loan default. Once an incorporated small business owner provides a personal 
guarantee for a loan, the lender has effectively pierced the owner’s limited liability protection gained 
through incorporating the business entity. This loss of limited liability protection provides the lender 
a legal recourse to satisfy the loan with the personal assets (net worth) and future earnings, if necessary, 
of the incorporated small business owner. In case of loan default, the personal guarantee's execution 
places the lender in a control position over the incorporated small business owner's personal assets. 
Lambrecht (2009) found, as did Mann (1997b), that guarantees provided by the small business owner 
give the lender recourse against the small business owner for any deficiency in payment. The only way 
to eliminate the small business owner's personal liability on a loan with a personal guarantee is for the 
owner to file for personal bankruptcy or for the leader to agree to remove the personal guarantee 
requirement from the loan.  
Understanding the distinction between the incorporated small business's financial 
responsibilities and the incorporated small business owner's personal financial responsibilities is 
required. When an incorporated business entity enters into a loan with a lender without a personal 
guarantee, repayment is the total responsibility of the incorporated business entity. In a loan 
transaction without a personal guarantee, the loan is a two-party transaction between the incorporated 
small business and the lender. When a personal guarantee is required and provided in a loan transaction 
with an incorporated small business, it becomes a three-party transaction. The incorporated small 
business owner signing personally is the third party. In the third-party role, the incorporated small 
business owner is signing personally, separated from the incorporated small business owner signing 
as an officer of the corporation. In making the loan, the incorporated small business owner will sign 
for the business entity as an officer (President, Vice President, Secretary, or Treasurer) committing the 
business entity and sign a second time as an individual pledging his or her net worth and future 
earnings.  
A personal guarantee liability far exceeds the incorporated small business owner's liability 
when the lender for a loan requires only collateral, whether business or personally owned collateral. 
The collateral only loan does not allow the lender to pierce the limited liability protection provided by 
incorporating the small business entity unless the incorporated small business owner has provided a 
personal asset as collateral. In that case, the lender can only pierce the owner’s limited liability to access 
the collateral in loan default. Duarte, Gama, and Gulamhussen (2018) found, "collateral removes the 
downside risk for owners while preserving the upside potential" (p. 592). 
In those circumstances, the lender can only take possession of the personal assets explicitly 
pledged as collateral. Collateral only loan default results in the surrender of the collateral to the lender. 
The incorporated small business owner has capped the risk of loss at the pledged collateral value in a 
collateral only loan. The credit rating on the incorporated small business may be diminished due to 
the default. However, the incorporated small business owner's personal assets and future earnings are 
not at risk other than the pledged collateral. After proceeds from the collateral sale or liquidation have 
been applied to the loan, any remaining loan balance is the lender's loss. 
To avoid or minimize any loss due to default, lenders often require both collateral (if available) 
and a personal guarantee. Requiring a personal guarantee along with business or personal collateral 
allows the lender to minimize any loss incurred through the sale of the collateral. This loan 
arrangement makes incorporated small business owners financially responsible for any remaining loan 
balance after the collateral sale or liquidation. This loan arrangement could deter the lender from 
working diligently to maximize the collateral sale proceeds because the lender has access to liquidate 
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance • Volume 22, No. 2, Winter 2020 • 1-29   
 
BROWN & SAUNDERS • ANALYZING THE DEMAND FOR THE PERSONAL GUARANTEE • 3 
the incorporated small business owner's personal assets as expediently as possible to satisfy the loan 
balance. 
Guaranties are essentially a contract among three parties: a creditor, a debtor, and a guarantor 
who promises to perform or pay damages on the debtor's behalf. (Katz, 1999)  When providing a 
personal guarantee, the incorporated small business owner has entered into the relationship (loan) as 
two separate entities: the debtor and the guarantor.  
 
1.1 “Guarantee” vs. “Guaranty” 
 
There is no essential difference between “guarantee” and “guaranty” other than the spelling.  
Financial scholars use the word “guarantee,” while legal scholars use the word "guaranty."  The word 
"guarantee" will be used throughout this document even when addressing the works of legal scholars 




Steijvers and Voordeckers (2009) found that, since Ang, Lin, and Tyler (1995), the use of the 
personal guarantee continues to be overlooked, understudied, and, in general, misunderstood in the 
field of finance. Steijvers and Voordeckers identified that some studies (Leeth & Scott, 1989; Berger 
& Udell, 1995; Haroff & Korting, 1998; Cowling, 1999) lump business and personal collateral together, 
while others (Hernandez-Canovas & Martinez-Salono, 2006; Voordeckers & Steijvers; 2006; Brick & 
Palia, 2007) address business and personal collateral separately. Unfortunately, all of these prior studies 
have failed to distinguish between business collateral and personal commitments (personal collateral 
and personal guarantees). This failure is because personal commitments are not generally or routinely 
part of finance for publicly traded businesses, the subject of most financial data collection to date. 
Mann (1997b) supposed that prior legal scholarship had not considered the landscape of small 
business lending, in which the personal guarantee is an essential factor because commercial law 
scholarship had also focused on the practices of large companies. 
While collateral used by large and small businesses has been the subject of many studies, 
personal guarantees are unique to small business lending. Prior studies' failure to distinguish between 
business collateral, personal collateral, and personal guarantees has likely contributed to the mixed 
results documented. Studies of risk-mitigating tools for loans that focus on collateral use by small 
businesses, but fail to distinguish between business collateral, personal collateral, and personal 
guarantees, should be reviewed to determine if this further delineation can explain the mixed or 
contradictory results. Prior mixed study results are possibly directly linked to the misunderstanding or 
omission of the personal guarantee's far-reaching impact. 
This research study includes a survey that poses questions that appertain to the demand for 
personal guarantees from the owners of incorporated small businesses, similar to the Federal Reserve 
Board's 1987 National Survey of Small Business Finances (NSSBF). Data collected will be compared 
to the results of the 1987 NSSBF to determine the trend in demand by lenders for personal guarantees 
from owners of incorporated small businesses over a 27-year period. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the banking industry in the U.S. underwent significant changes. 
Mann (1997b) links these banking sector changes beginning in the early 1990s with the banking 
industry's deregulation, allowing for interstate branching by individual banks. Interstate banking 
(branches of the same bank located and operating in multiple states) led to a period of significant 
merger and acquisition (M&A) activity during which information technology also experienced 
significant advancements. The banking industry began to find the small business lending sector much 
more attractive as a growth opportunity based on this new technology. The 1980s and 1990s 
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catapulted the banking sector from an industry consisting of large state banks with many locally owned 
and operated smaller banks to an industry composed of national banks with branches in multiple 
states. This transition yielded a constantly decreasing presence of locally owned and operated banks, 
as the M&A activity continued. Black & Strahan (2002) found that the deregulation of U.S. banks 
during the early 1990s resulted in an increased presence of larger banks through M&A activity and 
increased competition. The growth of the banks with a national presence in the U.S., coupled with the 
advancement in information technology, led to an extremely competitive banking industry.  
In order to reduce transaction costs of processing small business loans and to determine the 
probability of the small business owners repaying the loan, banks exploited the use of the small 
business owner’s personal credit information, which had become much less expensive to obtain as a 
result of advancements in the area of informatics. During the late 1980s, lenders began demanding 
personal guarantees more frequently.  
Avery, Bostic, and Samolyk (1998), the second documented study to examine this lack of 
separation between business and personal risks of small business owners, found a 57% increase in the 
use of personal guarantees by owners of incorporated small businesses between 1987 and 1993. Mann 
(1998) challenged Avery et al. (1998)'s findings, maintaining the study had not captured the actual 
magnitude of the increase in the demand for personal guarantees. Mann found Avery et al. (1998) had 
included unincorporated businesses in the analysis, and this had allowed the actual percentage of 
incorporated businesses providing personal guarantees to be understated. Additionally, the 1993 
NSSBF did not collect the source of any guarantees. Avery et al. (1998) had imputed the percentages 
of guarantees provided by the various sources and documented this in Footnote 14 of their paper. 
This calculation brings into question the validity of the findings of Avery et al. (1998). 
Mann (1998), not recognizing that Avery et al. (1998) had imputed the percentages of 
guarantees from the different sources, encouraged Avery et al. (1998) to continue their research while 
focusing only on incorporated business entities. A search conducted during 2014 did not identify any 
published article that accomplished what Mann had encouraged Avery et al. (1998) to do. During the 
literature search, Cole (2013) surfaced for its research on personal guarantees. Cole (2013) used the 
1987 and 1993 NSSBF, and the 1998 and 2003 Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF) to study 
capital structures of privately held U.S. firms. Cole used levels of leverage to conclude that 
incorporated businesses, which she found to be operating with higher leverage levels than 
unincorporated entities, must be doing so because the corporate firms had not provided personal 
guarantees. Mach and Wolken (2011) stated that many small business owners rely on personal assets 
to collateralize loans for their firms. Lambrecht (2009) suggested it could be beneficial to study the 
effect of personal guarantees on small business loans.  
 
1.3 Theoretical Basis for the Research 
 
While there are multiple research links to this study, two seminal works provide the foundation 
for the research: Leland and Pyle’s “Informational asymmetries, financial structure, and financial 
intermediation” (1977), and Stiglitz and Weiss’s “Credit rationing in markets with Imperfect 
information” (1981). “Information asymmetries” (Leland & Pyle, 1977) and “Credit rationing” 
(Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981) have both been, and continue to be, extensively researched and are found to 
impact a small business’ debt structure.  
Research indicates that information asymmetries (Leland & Pyle, 1977) are the major 
underlying issue impacting obtaining finances for small businesses. Credit rationing results from 
efforts to mitigate information asymmetries. Many times, matters that impact small business debt 
structure demonstrate linkage with information asymmetries. While collateral (Blazy & Weill, 2013; 
Menkhoff, Neuberger, & Rungruxsirivorn, 2012; Lambrecht, 2009; Voordeckers & Steijvers, 2006;  
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Jimenez & Saurina, 2004; Coco, 2000; Cowling, 1999; Black, de Mesa, & Jeffries, 1996; Berger & Udell, 
1990; de Mesa & Webb, 1992; Leeth & Scott, 1989; Bester, 1985, 1987, & 1994; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981; 
and Jaffee & Russell, 1976); banking relationships (Steijvers, Voordeckers, & Vanhoof, 2010;  
Chakravarty & Yilmazer, 2009; Neuberger & Rathke, 2009; de Bodt, Lobez, & Statnik, 2005; Jimenez 
& Saurina, 2004; Boot, 2000; Cole, 1998; Berger & Udell, 1995; Petersen & Rajan, 1994; Sharpe, 1990); 
loan covenants (Paglia, 2007); and shorter loan maturity periods (Bae & Goyal, 2009; Ortiz-Molina & 
Penas, 2008) have been identified as information asymmetry-reducing or mitigating tools, collateral 
has been more closely examined than these other risk-reducing tools. Bosse (2009) suggests that 
collateral, reputation, and relationships in banking have their unique benefits and that small businesses 
use a combination of these systematically. Duarte, Gama, and Esperanca (2017) found that market 
concentration increases "lazy" bank behavior as banks request collateral to reduce screening efforts 
and not mitigate risk. Collateral has been used to mitigate the asymmetric information obstacle of 
small businesses for several decades and probably for multiple centuries. 
 
1.4 The Problem Statement 
 
Owners of incorporated small businesses have been, and continue to be, required to accept 
personal liability for loans extended to their incorporated small businesses. Mann (1998) identified 
that Avery et al. (1998) documented a 57.5% increase in the use of personal guarantees by owners of 
incorporated small businesses during the six years starting in 1987 through 1993, as evidenced by the 
1987 and 1993 NSSBF data. Avery et al. (1998) imputed percentages of personal guarantees because 
the 1993 NSSBF did not collect the source of any guarantee. Additionally, neither the 1998 nor the 
2003 SSBF collected data on the source of any guarantee. This study's primary focus is on lenders’ 
demand for personal guarantees. Did lenders’ demand for personal guarantees from owners of 
incorporated small businesses increase between 1987 and 2014?    
 
1.5 Significance of the Study 
 
Ang, Lin, and Tyler (1995) recognized that a lack of separation between business and personal 
risks has significant public policy implications addressing credit market access for small businesses. 
Wu and Zeng (2008) identified that a dynamic and healthy Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise (SME) 
sector is vital to developed and developing industrialized countries. Ang et al. (1995), building on 
Bernanke and Lown (1991) findings, suggested that the demand for personal commitments may help 
explain why some business owners with little or no personal assets have a higher probability of 
experiencing credit rationing. Gama and Duarte (2015) find that personal collateral may be a more 
effective signaling indicator than business owned collateral. Tirelli (2019) points out that small 
businesses are not required to have audited financial statements, which contributes to small 
incorporated businesses' opaqueness.  
The small business industry's importance in any nation’s economy is well documented (Berger 
& Frame, 2007). The U.S. House of Representatives House Committee on Small Business issued an 
update to its Small Business Fact Sheet on May 21, 2013. In this document, the Committee provided 
the following information:   
1)  There are an estimated 27 million small businesses (generally described as an 
independent company with fewer than 500 employees).  
2.)  Small businesses employ about half of all private-sector employees while creating more 
than half of the nonfarm private gross domestic product.  
3.)  Small businesses are responsible for having generated 65% of new jobs over the past 
17 years. 
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4.)  Small businesses that have been in business for three and five years, which represent 
less than 1% of all companies, are referred to as “gazelle” firms. “Gazelle” firms, while 
comprising less than 1% of all companies in the U.S., generate approximately 10% of 
new jobs every year. 
5.)  Small businesses help fuel the U.S. economy by generating patents at 16.5 times the 
rate of large firms.  
Both the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives recognize the importance of small 
businesses to the U.S. economy and job creation. For example, on March 16, 2014, 137 bills were 
pending in either the House of Representatives or the Senate focused on assisting small businesses 
(e.g., Accelerate Our Startups Act, Growing Small Business Act, or Small Business Investment Act).  
Ang et al. (1995) identified four potential policy implications. First, an underinvestment issue 
could exist if risk-averse small business owners decide to forego positive net present value projects 
because they do not want to place their personal assets and wealth at risk. Second, if some owners are 
more willing to provide personal commitments, then owners who cannot provide personal 
commitments may be credit rationed. Third, the availability of personal commitments may diminish 
or mitigate the adverse impact of asymmetric information between small business owners and lenders. 
Fourth, finance theory, including capital structure, agency costs, risk aversion, and bankruptcy, may 
need to be reassessed as they pertain to small business.  
No one can overemphasize the importance of capital. Modigliani and Miller (1958) declared 
that companies should maximize their capital structure's debt element to exploit the tax advantage 
realized through interest expense deductibility. Myers (1984) explained why it is rational for firms to 
limit borrowing even though they can gain a tax advantage. Gamba and Triantis (2008) determined, 
through a survey of American and European CFOs, that the most crucial driver of a firm's capital 
structure decisions is the desire to have and maintain financial flexibility.  
Being required to provide more collateral than is needed to ensure full repayment to the lender 
in case of loan default is a de facto borrowing constraint placed upon small business owners who may 
not be able to take a positive net present value project in the future due to the constraining nature of 
an over-collateralized prior loan. Carbo-Valverde, Rodriguez-Fernandez, and Udell (2008) provided 
that financial constraints restrict firms' ability to pursue investment opportunities. Scherr and Hulburt 
(2001) found that small companies differ from each other in fundamental respects that influence the 
choice between short- and long-term debt financing.  
Avery et al. (1998) found that if personal commitments are prerequisites for obtaining credit 
for small businesses, the small business owner’s wealth will play a vital key role in determining the 
allocation of credit to small firms and their ultimate survival. These researchers raised the possibility 
that if personal commitments are prerequisites for small business lending, many small businesses may 
not appear as financial entities that are entirely separate from their owners. Avery et al. (1998), and 
Cavalluzzo and Wolken (2005) pointed out that if the personal wealth of the small business owner is 
critical to underwriting decisions, then owners who lack the resources to provide personal, financial 
commitments may find themselves unable to secure a small business loan. Avery et al. (1998) found 
any change in credit flow to small businesses may result in potentially significant economic 
consequences. Locking out a financial inflow to a small business, based solely on the small business 
owner’s inability to provide credible personal commitments, may negatively destroy a business 
concern that could provide more employment and other social benefits to society. Cavalluzzo and 
Wolken (2005) and Blanchflower, Levine, and Zimmerman (2003) suggested there exists a potential 
for discrimination in lending decisions against certain demographic groups. 
 The paper will proceed as follows. Section II will outline the research methodology, provide 
the research question, and describe the survey instrument. Section III will report the results and 
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summarize the findings. Section IV will conclude the study, discuss limitations, offer an update since 
the completion of this study, and suggestions for future research. 
 
2. Research Methodology 
 
This study focuses on determining changes in the demand for personal guarantees from 
owners of incorporated small businesses by lenders during a 27 year period, beginning in 1987 and 
continuing through 2014. This study has a three-fold purpose. The first is to increase awareness of the 
differences between business collateral and personal commitments, and between personal collateral 
and personal guarantees. The second is to document the current demand for personal guarantees by 
owners of incorporated small businesses for various loan types, categories, and uses, such as lines of 
credit, mortgages, equipment loans, vehicle loans, and "other loans." The third is to determine if it is 
possible for an incorporated small business owner to receive a loan from the same lender after refusing 
to provide a personal guarantee. This study responds to a recommendation by Mann (1998) to 
continue Avery, Bostic, and Samolyk (1998) initial efforts as more data sets become available and limit 
the review only to incorporated firms. 
This study builds on specific aspects of Ang et al.’s (1995) research into the use of personal 
commitments by small business owners, which was continued by Avery et al. (1998). Ang et al. (1995) 
used 692 firms' data from the 1987 NSSBF to identify those small business owners, including S-
Corporations and C-Corporations, who had a significant incidence of personal assets and wealth 
pledged for business loans. They confirmed a lack of separation between business and personal risks, 
even for incorporated small commercial entities. Avery et al. (1998) used the 1993 NSSBF to 
determine that guarantees are more prevalent than collateral and that organizational type, such as 
corporation versus sole proprietorship or partnership, is linked to commitment use. They point out 
that lending agencies know little about how personal commitments relate to financing arrangements 
in practice, despite the potential for personal commitments to affect which loans small firms receive. 
Avery et al. (1998) identified a lack of available data sets containing detailed information about 
personal commitments (collateral and guarantees) in small business finance as one reason for limited 
academic literature. They further identified that the few data sets available aggregate all collateral, 
making no distinctions between business versus personal collateral and provide no information on 
guarantees. 
Initially, this study was planned as an extension of the Avery et al. (1998) research, expanding 
the analysis to include data collected during the 1998 and 2003 SSBF. Between the 1993 NSSBF and 
the 1998 survey, the Federal Reserve Board renamed this series of investigations by dropping 
"National" from the title, and therefore, the last two surveys of the series are titled "Survey of Small 
Business Finances" (1998 and 2003). Avery et al. (1998) used the 1993 NSSBF to identify trends in 
the role of personal wealth in small business finance in comparison to data collected during the 1987 
NSSBF. They noted that, of particular interest to their study, the NSSBF is the only public data source 
that identifies if and how small business loans are collateralized and if and by whom each loan is 
guaranteed. Unfortunately, the 1993 NSSBF, unlike the 1987 NSSBF, did not collect any data on the 
source of the guarantee. The 1993 NSSBF only collected data on the use of a guarantee. In Footnote 
14 of Avery et al. (1998), they provide the following: 
Unfortunately [sic], the 1993 survey did not include questions on loan guarantees' specific 
sources when guarantees were present. Therefore, we imputed shares of 1993 loan balances 
that are owner-guaranteed using data from the 1987 survey. Similarly, we are unable to 
distinguish between owner collateral and other personal collateral. 
It is noteworthy that, while imputing the percentage of loan guarantee sources based on the loan type, 
for 1993's data, there was an increase from 1987's data in the number of guarantees in general. 
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Both the 1987 and 1993 NSSBF asked if a cosigner or another guarantor was required to get 
credit line(s), mortgage(s), equipment loan(s), vehicle loan(s), or other loans. The 1987 Survey included 
the following: 
Questions B13 (credit lines), B20 (mortgages), B27 (motor vehicle loans), B34 (equipment 
loans), and B41 (Other Loans – specifically, loans from partners/stockholders) asked, “Was a cosigner 
or guarantor required to get (this/any of these) (type of loan)?” Questions B14, B21, B28, and B35 
asked, “Were these cosigners or guarantors….a. Owners? b. other individuals or business firms? c. the 
Small Business Administration? d. another government agency? e. some other source?” The available 
responses were Yes, No, Don’t Know and Refusal. Question B41 only provided two choices for the 
guarantee – a. owners and b. other individuals or business firms.  
The 1993 NSSBF changed the wording from 1987, and questions F14 asked, "Was a personal 
guaranty, cosigner, or other guarantor required to obtain any line of credit at (Name of Lender)?"  
Questions F26 (mortgages), F31 (motor vehicle loans), F36 (equipment), and F47 (other loans) asked 
the same question for the specific loan type. No follow-up question collected data on the specific 
source of a guarantee. The 1998 SSBF and the 2003 SSBF used the same question format as the 1993 
NSSBF, not collecting any data on the specific guarantee source.  
The 1998 and 2003 SSBF also collected data regarding whether a guarantee, by either a 
cosigner or other guarantor, was required to get credit line(s), mortgage(s), equipment loan(s), vehicle 
loan(s), or other loans. The 1998 and 2003 SSBF, just like the 1993 NSSBF, did not collect any data 
on the exact source of the guarantee. Only the 1987 NSSBF collected detailed data on the source of 
any guarantee by inquiring, "Were these cosigners or guarantors ……a) owners, b) other individuals 
or business firms, c) the Small Business Administration, d) another government agency or, e) some 
other source?” (Federal Reserve Board, 1987, Survey Questions B14, 21, 28, 35, 42 and 52). 
Mann(1998) had credibility issues with Avery et al. (1998) provided data and its methodology. 
Mann's position is that Avery et al. had understated the demand in 1993 for personal guarantees from 
incorporated small business owners for each of the loan types. This understatement identified by 
Mann in Avery et al. for the requirement of personal guarantees in 1993 could be a direct result of the 
1993 NSSBF's dropping the question related to identifying the guarantee's source.  
A review of 39 published academic articles that reference Avery et al. (1998) confirmed no 
research had conducted the specific recommendations made by Mann, to focus only on the 
incorporated firms for future data sets, which would be the investigations for 1998 and 2003.  
Mann (1998) found the Avery et al. (1998) study's most essential aspect: it was the first attempt 
to provide any empirical data about small business owners' personal financial strength in the 
underwriting of small business loans. Mann (1998) acknowledged that while this may not seem to be 
of any importance to the casual observer, underwriting changes had made this crucial for banks in the 
small-business finance market. Mann (1998) had a high level of interest in the work of Avery et al. 
because during the same general period, Mann (1997a & b) was exploring the use of secured versus 
non-secured credit for both large and small businesses. Mann (1998) considered the research 
accomplished by Avery et al. (1998) to be significant and supportive of his positions on the growing 
demand for the personal guarantee with one exception. He noted that the percentage of loans held by 
small corporate business owners supported by a personal guarantee was much lower than Mann 
(1997b &1998) had anticipated. A discussion between a researcher of this study and Mann identified 
that Mann (1998) did not realize the 1993 NSSBF did not include the collection of guarantee source 
and that Avery et al. had used imputed values from the 1987 NSSBF. 
Mann (1998) considered the data used by Avery et al. (1998), pulled from both the 1987 and 
1993 NSSBF, to be the best data available for this type of study. However, based on the rapid changes 
in the banking industry, specifically with small business underwriting, Mann considered the 1987 and 
1993 data to be relatively outdated for studying personal guarantees in 1998. Without an awareness of 
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the deletion of guarantee sources' collection, Mann recognized the 1998 SSBF data set upcoming 
release. He thought the 1998 SSBF data would provide a much more accurate insight into the personal 
guarantee's actual demand level. 
Mann (1998) referenced that in an earlier document (1997b), he had already indicated that 
underwriting changes since 1993 had a high probability of altering collateral and guarantee usage in 
small business lending throughout the 1990s. He further indicated that he hoped that Avery et al. 
(1998) would continue their ongoing work by updating their findings as future data sets become 
available. Mann (1998) considered the personal guarantee to be even more critical than Avery et al. 
suggested.  
Mann (1998) made two suggestions on how to best approach analyzing the use of personal 
guarantees. He suggested that the reviewer examine loans made to firms where the firm's legal, 
organizational form prevents the small business's principals' personal liability. Secondly, they should 
assess only the loans in which principals of the borrower provide personal guarantees, and, in doing 
so, agree to accept personal liability for the loan. 
A search for published academic articles referencing Avery et al. (1998) did not identify any 
researchers who had undertaken the Mann (1998) recommendation. The review did identify, however, 
Cole (2013), who used the 1987 and 1993 NSSBF, and the 1998 and 2003 SSBF to examine the capital 
structures of privately-held U.S. firms. Cole speculated that small corporate companies' median 
leverage ratios would be the same as those used by proprietorships if personal guarantees were 
required. Cole contended that if the median leverage ratios for incorporated entities are higher than 
the median leverage ratios of sole proprietorships, owners of incorporated small businesses have not 
given up their limited liability by executing personal guarantees. When Cole found that proprietorships 
use far less leverage than incorporated small businesses, she concluded that most owners of 
incorporated small businesses are not required to provide personal guarantees. This study will validate 
Cole's assertion or show that Cole came to an incorrect linkage between median leverage ratios and 
organizational types to conclude personal guarantee usage. 
 
2.1 Research Question 
 
The overarching research question is: Between 1987 and 2014, did the demand for personal 
guarantees from owners of incorporated small businesses increase for various loan types?  Five 
different loan types will be examined in this survey: lines of credit, mortgages, equipment loans, vehicle 
loans, and other loans. Fifteen testable hypotheses in this study are as follows: 
H10:   Personal guarantees did not increase in usage for owners of incorporated small 
businesses, including both S and C-Corporations for lines of credit between 1987 and 2014.  
H20:   Personal guarantees did not increase in usage for owners of incorporated small 
businesses, including both S and C-Corporations for mortgages between 1987 and 2014.  
H30:   Personal guarantees did not increase in usage for owners of incorporated small 
businesses, including both S and C-Corporations for equipment loans between 1987 and 2014.  
H40:   Personal guarantees did not increase in usage for owners of incorporated small 
businesses, including both S and C-Corporations for vehicle loans between 1987 and 2014.  
H50:   Personal guarantees did not increase in usage for owners of incorporated small 
businesses, including both S and C-Corporations for other loans between 1987 and 2014.  
H60:   Personal guarantees did not increase in usage for owners of incorporated small 
businesses for S-Corporations for lines of credit between 1987 and 2014. 
H70:   Personal guarantees did not increase in usage for owners of incorporated small 
businesses for S-Corporations for mortgages between 1987 and 2014. 
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H80:   Personal guarantees did not increase in usage for owners of incorporated small 
businesses for S-Corporations for equipment loans between 1987 and 2014.  
H90:   Personal guarantees did not increase in usage for owners of incorporated small 
businesses for S-Corporations for vehicle loans between 1987 and 2014.  
H100:   Personal guarantees did not increase in usage for owners of incorporated small 
businesses for S-Corporations for other loans between 1987 and 2014.  
H110:   Personal guarantees did not increase in usage for owners of incorporated small 
businesses for C-Corporations for lines of credit between the years of 1987 and 2014. 
H120:   Personal guarantees did not increase in usage for owners of incorporated small 
businesses for C-Corporations for mortgages between 1987 and 2014.  
H130:   Personal guarantees did not increase in usage for owners of incorporated small 
businesses for C-Corporations for equipment loans between 1987 and 2014.  
H140:   Personal guarantees did not increase in usage for owners of incorporated small 
businesses for C-Corporations for vehicle loans between 1987 and 2014.  
H150:   Personal guarantees did not increase in usage for owners of incorporated small 
businesses for C-Corporations for other loans between 1987 and 2014.  
 
2.2 Survey Instrument  
 
The researchers used the 1987 NSSBF to identify the loan types included in the survey for this 
paper (i.e., lines of credit, mortgages, equipment loans, vehicle loans, and other loans). Avery et al. 
(1998) noted that the 1987 NSSBF collected data for for-profit, non-agricultural, non-financial firms 
with fewer than 500 full-time equivalent employees. The organizations reviewed in the 1987 NSSBF 
consisted of a nationally representative sample of small businesses operating in the U.S. as of the last 
day of each survey year.  
This study includes a survey of small business lending focused on personal guarantees 
provided by owners of small incorporated businesses located in the United States. The survey focuses 
on 1987 NSSBF loan types and guarantee sources to allow for a comparison between the 1987 NSSBF 
data and the data collected during this study. One significant change in this new study is that this study 
has a much narrower scope than the 1987 NSSBF. The 1987 NSSBF included other lending issues 
throughout the U.S. in addition to the demand and source of guarantees. Additionally, the 1987 
NSSBF collected data via telephone interviews.  
The final survey format went through a multiple phase development consisting of three pilot 
surveys. The pilot surveys, without a doubt, contributed heavily to the quality and effectiveness of the 
final questions. SurveyMonkey was used to conduct data collection during April and May 2015 using 




Dun and Bradstreet’s Hoover database in October 2014, contained data on slightly more than 
four million incorporated small businesses in the United States. A confidence level of 95% with a 
margin of error of 5% for a four million targeted population requires 384. The investigation remained 
open on SurveyMonkey until 6,197 respondents had identified themselves as either the owner or a 
small business manager for the owner(s) to obtain the 394 completed responses for Question 8. 
The 6,197 respondents included a combined total of 1,462 respondents who owned or 
managed S and C-Corporations (Question 3). Question 4 of the survey was the first survey question 
focused on lending. Question 4 inquired, “Did your corporation have any loans during 2014, including 
any lines of credit that were in place but may not have been used during 2014?”  Of the 1,462 
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respondents identified as an owner or manager of an S or C-Corporation, 17 respondents did not 
respond to Question 4, reducing the total respondents to Question 4 to 1,445. Of these 1,445 
respondents, only 536 (37.09%) had any loans, including lines of credit, in place during 2014. 
20 of the 536 respondents with loans during 2014 were eliminated from the study because 
their corporations were publicly traded (Question 5). An additional 62 respondents were eliminated 
from the survey because the businesses involved one or more of the following industries: Agriculture, 
forestry, and fishing industry; Finance and insurance underwriting industry; or Real estate investment 
trusts industry (Question 6). The researchers eliminated 11 other corporations because they had more 
than 500 employees (Question 7). This filtering (elimination) process brought the total number of 
respondents meeting the targeted profile to 443. Of these 443 respondents, only 394 responded to 
Questions 8 and 9. Question 9 identified 204 of the 394 corporations that had at least one loan that 
required a guarantee.  
Table 1 lists the first eight survey questions and the corresponding number of respondents 
who responded to each of the first eight questions and the corresponding number of respondents 
eliminated from the survey as the questions filtered out those respondents who did not meet the 
targeted profile. Table 2 provides the demographic characteristics of the 394 respondents' small 
businesses. 
 
Table 1: Summary of Survey Respondents for the First Eight Survey Questions 
Question 
Number Question Respondents Eliminated 
Remaining 
Participants 
1 Do you own or manage a small to medium-sized business (1 to 500 employees)? 8,217 2,020 6,197 
2 What is the age of your business? 5,936 - 5,936 
3 What is the organizational form of your business? 5,936 4,474 1,462 
4 
Did your corporation have any loans in lace during 
2014, including any lines of credit that were in place 
but may not have been used during 2014? 
1,445 909 536 
5 Is your business publicly traded? 536 20 516 
6 
Is your business involved with one or more of the 
following industries: Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
Industry; Finance and insurance underwriting industry, 
and/or Real estate investment trust industry? 
516 62 454 
7 
How many employees does your company currently 
have? (Please include all full-time, part-time, and any 
contracted employees.) 
454 11 443 
8 
For loans in place during 2014, were business collateral 
and/or personal commitments (personal collateral or 
personal guarantee) pledged as security?  It is possible 
that both types of collateral (business and/or personal) 
and a guarantee were required to secure a loan. Please 
indicate all that are applicable for each loan type listed 
below. Business collateral consists of assets such as real 
property, equipment, vehicles, etc. owned by the 
business. Personal collateral are asset(s), owned by an 
owner of the business, that have been pledged as 
security for a loan. A guarantee is a promise by a 
cosigner or a guarantor (usually a business owner) to 
satisfy (reimburse or repay the lender for) the loan if 
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Table 2: Number of Businesses with Loans by Organizational (Legal) Form,  
Gender and Age Compared to Annual Revenue   
  Organizational (Legal) Form Gender Age of Business (Years) 
Annual Revenue 
S & C Corp S Corp C Corp Female Male < 3 3 - 5 6 - 10 11 - 20 >20 
< $250,000 67 50 17 31 36 6 3 8 28 22 
$250,000 - $500,000 53 40 13 24 29 5 3 7 10 28 
$500,001 - $1,000,000 68 56 12 25 43 0 3 6 25 34 
$1,000,001 - $5,000,000 116 76 40 55 61 0 4 11 26 75 
> $5,000,000 79 42 37 21 58 0 0 7 15 57 
Totals  383 264 119 156 227 11 13 39 104 216 
Note: 11 of the 394 Respondents did not provide annual revenue in Question 17. 
 
Question 8 is the first question in the survey that seeks specific information on each of the 
five types of loans, the kind of collateral, and if a guarantee was required to obtain the loan. 
Additionally, Question 8 provides the respondents the choices of "Have this loan under other 
arrangements" and "Did not have this type of loan."  The number of guarantees identified in Question 
10 exceeded the number of guarantees identified in Question 8. Question 8 does not duplicate 
Question 10 other than requesting if various types of loans required a guarantee. Question 9 asked, 
"Did any of the loans in the above question require a guarantee?"  Questions 8 and 9 do not request 
any identification of the source of the guarantee. A response of “Yes” to Question 9 then prompted 
the respondent to answer Question 10, “Please indicate below the source of the guarantee for each 
applicable loan type?"  SurveyMonkey staff recommended using Question 9 to ensure the only 
respondents provided access to 10 had indicated their corporations were required to provide a 
guarantee for at least one of the loan types in Question 8. Question 10 is made available only by 
respondents, indicating in Question 9 that their corporation had a loan with a guarantee — question 
10 collected data on the source of the guarantee for specific loan types.  
This study's Chi-Square analyzes used the responses to Question 10. Tables 7, 8, and 9 provide 
a breakdown of the number of S Corporations, C Corporations, and the combined total of S and C 
Corporations that provided personal guarantees for the five different loan types. Tables 3, 4, and 5 
summarize the number of specific loan types that required personal guarantees by organizational form. 
 
Table 3: Percentage of Loans by Type with Personal Guarantees in 2014 Held  
by Both S & C Corporations 
  Question 8 Question 10   












Percentage of Loans 
by Type with 
Personal Guarantees 
LOC 394 71 323 161 49.85% 
Mortgage 394 272 122 54 44.26% 
Equipment 394 263 131 59 45.04% 
Vehicle 394 275 119 48 40.34% 
Other 394 310 84 40 47.62% 
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Table 4: Percentage of Loans by Type with Personal Guarantees in 2014 Held 
by S Corporations Only 
  Question 8 Question 10   












Percentage of Loans 
by Type with 
Personal Guarantees 
LOC 271 50 221 107 48.42% 
Mortgage 271 190 81 40 49.38% 
Equipment 271 176 95 42 44.21% 
Vehicle 271 188 83 38 45.78% 
Other 271 215 56 31 55.36% 
 
Table 5: Percentage of Loans by Type with Personal Guarantees in 2014 Held 
by C Corporations Only 
  Question 8 Question 10   












Percentage of Loans 
by Type with 
Personal Guarantees 
LOC 123 21 102 54 52.94% 
Mortgage 123 82 41 14 34.15% 
Equipment 123 87 36 17 47.22% 
Vehicle 123 87 36 10 27.78% 
Other 123 95 28 9 32.14% 
 
Table 6 summarizes the percentages provided in Tables 3, 4, and 5 comparing the percentages 
of loans that required personal guarantees by loan types.  
 
Table 6: Percentage of Loans by Type with Personal Guarantees 
in 2014 by Organizational Form 
Loan Type S Corporations C Corporations 
S & C 
Corporations 
LOC 48.42% 52.94% 49.85% 
Mortgage 49.38% 34.15% 44.26% 
Equipment 44.21% 47.22% 45.04% 
Vehicle 45.78% 27.78% 40.34% 
Other 55.36% 32.14% 47.62% 
 
3.1 Chi-Square Analyses 
 
The researchers applied Chi-Square analysis for each type of loan for the three categories— S 
& C corporations, S corporations Only, and C corporations. Only to determine if the variation 
between the 1987 and 2014 percentages of loans with personal guarantees was significant. Tables 7, 
8, and 9 have the results of the fifteen Chi-Square analyses. There is an increase in the use of personal 
guarantees in 14 of 15 comparisons. In 6 of these comparisons, the increase is statistically significant 
at the 5% level. 
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Table 7: Results of Chi-Square Analyses for Both S and C Corporations Combined,  

















Credit 44.22% 49.85% 12.73% 0.09 No 
H2 Mortgages 38.88% 44.26% 13.86% 0.28 No 
H3 Equipment  28.80% 45.04% 56.36% 0.00 Yes 
H4 Vehicle 18.18% 40.34% 121.85% 0.00 Yes 
H5 Other Loans 28.98% 47.62% 64.31% 0.00 Yes 
 
Table 8: Results of Chi-Square Analyses for S Corporations Only, by Loan Type  

















Credit 48.08% 48.42% 0.71% 0.83 No 
H7 Mortgages 39.45% 49.38% 25.18% 0.17 No 
H8 Equipment  32.58% 44.21% 35.68% 0.11 No 
H9 Vehicle 17.36% 45.78% 163.80% 0.00 Yes 
H10 Other Loans 22.67% 55.36% 144.22% 0.00 Yes 
 
Table 9: Results of Chi-Square Analyses for C Corporations Only, by Loan Type 

















Credit 43.07% 52.94% 22.91% 0.07 No 
H12 Mortgages 38.68% 34.15% -11.72% 0.57 No 
H13 Equipment  27.60% 47.22% 71.10% 0.02 Yes 
H14 Vehicle 18.41% 27.78% 50.89% 0.17 No 
H15 Other Loans 30.96% 32.14% 3.81% 0.90 No 
 
Vehicle loans and "other loans" for S-Corporations showed statistically significant variation 
from 1987 until 2014. Equipment loans for C-Corporations showed statistically significant variation 
from 1987 until 2014. Three loan types have experienced statistically significant variation during 27 
years for all corporations combined (S and C corporations) - equipment loans, vehicle loans, and other 
loans.  
 
3.2 Findings from Questions 11 through 16 
 
385 of the 394 Question 8 respondents whose corporations had loans responded to Questions 
11, 12, and 13. The 385 responses to each of these three questions yield a 95% confidence level with 
a 5% margin of error when making inferences about the total population of incorporated small 
businesses located in the United States. These three questions focused on actions taken since 2008 by 
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an incorporated small business owner who either decided not to provide a personal guarantee to obtain 
a loan or the lender declined (denied) a loan because of the corporate small business owner's inability 
to meet the lender's personal guarantee requirements. In response to Question 11, 48 (12.5 %) of 385 
respondents indicated that their corporation decided not to undertake a positive net present value 
project because the lender required a personal guarantee. Question 12 identified that 42 (10.9%) of 
385 respondents indicated their corporation had been declined (denied) a loan because of the owner's 
inability to meet the lender's personal guarantee requirements. Question 13 identified six (1.6%) of 
385 respondents' corporations where the lender denied credit to the corporation because a minority 
shareholder refused to provide a personal guarantee. Question 13 regarding minority shareholders' 
stems from the Small Business Administration's (SBA's) 504 Loan Guarantee program. This SBA 
program requires all individuals holding more than 20% of the corporation's equity to provide a 
personal guarantee for all loans secured by the SBA. This SBA requirement places a burden on 
minority shareholders to execute personal guarantees when the minority shareholder is not in a control 
position.  
A response of "yes" to either Questions 11, 12, or 13 provided the respondent the opportunity 
to address Question 14, which focused on the impact of the incorporated small business owner not 
meeting the lender's personal guarantee requirements or the incorporated small business owner's 
decision not to provide a personal guarantee. While 15 (19.7 %) of the 76 respondents indicated no 
impact on their corporation, 40 (52.6%) of the 76 respondents indicated they had to seek funding 
elsewhere. 27 (35.6%) of 76 respondents indicated they could not pursue new products or services. 
21 (27.6%) of 76 respondents indicated that their corporations had to forego an expansion project, 
and the same number of respondents indicated their corporations could not hire additional staff. 17 
(22.4%) of the 76 respondents indicated their corporations had to lay off staff, and two (2.6%) of the 
76 respondents indicated their corporations could not fulfill an order or contract. The small number 
of only 76 respondents does not yield a high level of confidence for making inferences about the total 
population of incorporated small businesses with loans located in the United States.  
Question 15 inquired if the respondent’s corporation had ever refused to provide a personal 
guarantee to obtain a loan. A little over 15% (58) of the 383 respondents who answered this question 
indicated they had refused to provide a personal guarantee to obtain a loan. The 383 respondents are 
just below the 384 required responses to have a 95% confidence level with a 5% margin of error for 
making inferences about the total population of incorporated small businesses located in the United 
States with loans.  
In response to Question 15, 58 respondents indicated they had refused to provide a personal 
guarantee to obtain a loan. Of that number, 55 responded to Question 16, pointing out that 23 
(41.82%) of these 58 corporations still received a loan or credit from the same lender after refusing to 
provide a personal guarantee.  
 
3.3 Summary of Findings 
 
Incorporated small business owners with loans in 2014 provided personal guarantees to secure 
five different types of loans. Between the years of 1987 and 2014, the percentage of loans with personal 
guarantees from the incorporated small business owners, as reflected in Table 11, increased by 12.73%, 
13.86 %, 56.36%, 121.85%, and 64.31% for lines of credit, mortgages, equipment loans, vehicle loans, 
and other loans respectively.  
The importance of a dynamic and healthy Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise (SME) sector 
to developed and developing countries has been well documented (Wu & Zeng, 2008). Ang et al. 
(1995) recognized the existence of a lack of separation between business and personal risks for the 
owners of small businesses might limit and, in some cases, eliminate access to credit for small business 
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owners with limited or no personal net worth. Restricted access to capital negatively impacts the 
current and future opportunities for owners of small businesses and for communities where small 
businesses operate. The importance of small businesses in the United States economy cannot be 
overstated (Berger & Frame, 2007). The U.S. House of Representatives House Committee on Small 
Business has identified access to capital for small businesses as a critical priority. Simultaneously, the 
Committee recognizes that small businesses employ more than 50% of the United States workforce, 
create two-thirds of new jobs, and generate more than 40% of the private sector’s contribution to the 
gross domestic product (Small Business Committee, 2016). 
The results of this survey documents that almost one out of every two loans held by the owner 
of an incorporated small business contains a risk-shifting mechanism, the personal guarantee. This 
risk-shifting mechanism effectively provides the lender access to the borrower's total net worth and 
future earnings in loan default. Coco (2000) noted that there might exist a gap between the 
entrepreneur's and the bank's valuation of the asset. Coco continued with, "In this case, the use of 
collateral, by increasing the riskiness of the return to the entrepreneur, provokes an inefficient risk 
allocation among the agents" (p. 193). Agents, in this case, referring to the lender and the borrower. 
The same holds on a loan with a personal guarantee. The incorporated small business owner's risk 
increases when providing a personal guarantee. The financial impact of the Great Recession is beyond 
the scope of this study. The Great Recession's financial impact on owners of incorporated small 
businesses continues to be experienced in many communities across the United States today. If one 
out of every two loans held by an incorporated small business contains a personal guarantee, there are 
many loans with potential inefficient risk allocation. Risk allocation in favor of the lenders, whom 
many argue today, contributed heavily to the Great Recession's root cause. 
The survey data finds incorporated small businesses in the United States are underleveraged. 
In 2014, less than 37% of incorporated small businesses had loans. In 1987, more than 67% of 
incorporated small companies located in the United States had loans. Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
declared that companies should maximize their capital structure's debt element to exploit the tax 
advantage realized through the interest expense deductibility. This decrease of more than 45% in the 
percentage of incorporated small businesses with loans between 1987 and 2014 should be of great 
concern to every member of the U.S. House of Representatives, House Committee on Small Business. 
This study has documented the occurrence of two of the four implications raised by Ang et 
al. (1995) that could exist or may occur due to the lack of separation between personal and business 
risk. Actions by owners of incorporated small businesses since 2008 support the following 
determinations. These determinations have a 95% level of confidence, with a 5% margin of error. 
First, an underinvestment problem exists as 12.5% of owners of incorporated small businesses with 
at least one loan have decided not to undertake a positive investment opportunity (positive net present 
value project) because the lender required a personal guarantee. Closer analysis of this particular data 
shows that half of the 12.5% of S and C Corporations were greater than 20 years of age. 22.2%, 27.6%, 
18%, 13.87% of corporations with a business age of 3 to 5 years, 6 to 10 years, 11 to 20 years, and 
greater than 20 years respectively decided not to undertake a positive net present value investment 
because the lender required a personal guarantee. 
Second, lenders have denied a loan to 10.9% of small business corporations with at least one 
loan resulting in credit rationing because of their inability to meet the lender's personal guarantee 
requirements. This 10.9% of S and C Corporations included 13.7% of corporations with 1 to 9 
employees, 24.5% of corporations with 10 to 19 employees, and 12.5% of corporations with 20 to 49 
employees. Lenders have not denied S and C Corporations with 50 to 250 employees and 251 to 500 
employees a loan because of their inability to meet the lender's guarantee requirements. 
This study also identified an occurrence of immediate importance to owners of incorporated 
small businesses seeking loans. Of 58 corporations that refused to provide a personal guarantee when 
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requested by the lender, 23 (39.7%) still received financing from the same lender. The percentage that 
still received a loan varied by gender. Only 22.2% of female respondents still received the same lender 
loan after refusing to provide a personal guarantee compared to 51.4% of male respondents. This high 
percentage of lending demonstrates that lenders sometimes request personal guarantees when they are 
willing to make the loan without a personal guarantee. No corporations under five years of age 




An entrepreneur strives to determine and understand all risks for any project they are 
considering undertaking. Financial theory demands that an entrepreneur take on any positive net 
present value (NPV) project. To correctly assess the overall project risks, the entrepreneur must 
understand the additional risk assumed when providing a personal commitment (personal collateral 
or personal guarantee) to obtain a loan for a potential investment opportunity. The incorporated small 
business owner should consider all project risks when determining the discount rate for an NPV 
analysis. The requirement to provide a personal guarantee and or personal collateral creates additional 
risk for the owner on the project beyond the future cash flows' risk. 
The personal guarantee frequency makes it critical that both undergraduate and graduate 
students know the differences between business collateral and personal commitments. Business 
students need to understand the far-reaching loan default consequences when they provide personal 
commitments to obtain or secure funding for an incorporated small business. This study provides 
insight into the percentage of loans in 2014 that involve personal collateral and personal guarantees.  
Stiglitz and Weise (1981), in their seminal article on the use of collateral in bank loans, did not 
distinguish between collateral owned by the business and collateral owned personally by the owner. It 
was not until Ang et al. (1995) that researchers documented the lack of separation between the small 
business owner's business and personal risks. Mann (1998) provided the importance of distinguishing 
between incorporated (S and C corporations) and non-incorporated entities (sole proprietorships and 
partnerships) because personal guarantees only increase the risk of owners of incorporated small 
businesses. Non-incorporated entities do not have limited liability protection, and therefore, the owner 
of a non-incorporated entity is personally responsible for any liabilities of the business. Some Limited 
Liability Companies (LLCs) operate as non-incorporated entities. Some U.S. states allow LLCs to 
operate as either an incorporated or non-incorporated entity.  
Through personal interviews with a non-random small group of small business bankers, Mann 
(1997b) concluded, “To the extent small business lenders require secured credit, they do so largely for 
one significant benefit: secured credit allows small business lenders to obtain a credible commitment 
that borrowers will refrain from excessive future borrowing” (p. 2). Mann continues, “Secured credit 
provides little in the way of liquidation value because the assets of small businesses tend to have low 
liquidation values. Similarly, it does little to improve the borrower’s incentives, because the lender can 
accomplish the same goal by taking a guarantee from the borrower’s principal” (p. 2). Mann used these 
points to support his position that small business borrowing is unsecured even though this contrasts 
with Berger and Frame (2007) findings. Small business loans backed by a personal guarantee from the 
owner of an incorporated small business provide the lender access to the owner’s net worth and future 
earnings, if necessary, to repay the personally guaranteed loan. The only personal assets not reachable 
by the lender are those personal assets used to secure other loans. Most jointly owned personal assets 
are also protected from the lender if the other joint owner(s) did not provide a personal guarantee for 
the defaulting loan.  
Capital and access to capital are essential. Modigliani and Miller (1958) declared that businesses 
should maximize the debt element of their capital structure fully to exploit the tax advantage realized 
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance • Volume 22, No. 2, Winter 2020 • 1-29   
 
BROWN & SAUNDERS • ANALYZING THE DEMAND FOR THE PERSONAL GUARANTEE • 18 
through the deductibility of the interest expense, but at what risk?  Again, entrepreneurs must have a 
thorough understanding of the risks associated with any loan the entrepreneur undertakes. 
This study documents that over 15% of incorporated small businesses with a minimum of at 
least one loan in 2014 have successfully negotiated away the requirement to provide personal 
guarantees by refusing to provide the guarantee. While the lender may decline the loan, this study 
documented that over 41% of the 15% of owners of incorporated small businesses who refuse to 
provide a personal guarantee when requested still received the loan from the same lender.  
Second, the findings of this study support the positions taken by previous researchers. This 
study confirmed the existence of a potential underinvestment issue suggested by Ang et al. (1995), as 
12.5% of incorporated small businesses with at least one loan did not undertake positive net value 
projects because owners did not want to place their personal assets and wealth at risk. This study 
confirmed an additional implication raised by Ang et al. (1995) as 10.9% of corporations were credit 
rationed because of the owner's inability to meet the lender's personal guarantee requirements. 
This study documents that personal guarantees are prevalent in small business lending. While 
Cole (2013) concludes that owners of incorporated small business owners are not required to provide 
personal guarantees, this study's results indicate otherwise. 
 
4.1 Conclusions Drawn from the Study 
 
Personal guarantees are a factor in lending to privately held incorporated small businesses. 
Data shows for five loan types in place during 2014 – lines of credit, mortgages, equipment loans, 
vehicle loans, and other loans, personal guarantees were required for almost 50% of the loans. The 
presence of personal guarantees probably contributes to the inconsistencies of prior studies. Studies 
that focused on either or both business and personal collateral required for securing business loans 
without any recognition or consideration given to the presence of personal guarantees. 
The finding that only 37% of incorporated small businesses had any loans during 2014 
documents that the United States small business sector has not recovered from the Great Recession. 
The 1987 NSSBF data identified 67% of incorporated small businesses had existing loans in 1987. 




Owners of incorporated small businesses must have a thorough understanding of the risks 
associated with borrowing money for their businesses. This study's researchers anticipate that the 
percentage of loans with personal guarantees is probably much higher than reflected by the data 
collected during this study. Two factors support the researchers’ position. First, if an owner does not 
have an understanding of what constitutes a personal guarantee, the owner might not know was 
provided. Mann (1997b) raised the concern that many small business owners have relatively limited 
financial expertise. Mann believed that small business owners were probably ill-prepared to adequately 
assess the cost and benefits of various secured and unsecured transactions. He concluded that if this 
were the case, banks could require personal commitments from the owners because the borrowers 
would not evaluate those financial risks accurately in deciding whether to accept the lender's terms. 
When they can obtain the loan, they just accept the terms potentially without recognizing that they 
are providing a personal guarantee. After all, some will say, if one borrows money, one should pay it 
back. Mann's conclusion of small business owners' financial understanding may have contributed to 
an understatement of the percentage of loans during 2014 with personal guarantees. 
Second, Question 8 of the survey provided a choice of "Have this loan under other 
arrangements."  For this analysis, these arrangements consist of loans without business collateral, 
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personal collateral, or personal guarantee. This assumption would lead to a potential understatement 
of the percentage of loans with personal guarantees if these arrangements were not some form of a 
loan. 
Conducting future research on the demand for either business or personal collateral without 
also determining the presence of a personal guarantee for each specific loan distorts the research from 
the start. Failure to consider the presence of personal guarantees in past studies may have contributed 
to the mixed and sometimes contrasting findings of the individual studies. Based on the prevalence of 
personal guarantees in the lending process for incorporated small businesses, this study's researchers 
recommend incorporating some personal guarantees coverage in all undergraduate and graduate 
introductory level finance courses. 
 
4.3 Update since This Study 
 
Ang (2018) presents a corporate finance theory for the entrepreneurial firm. Ang defines an 
entrepreneurial firm as a firm with the potential to create significant wealth well beyond the owner's 
wealth. The wealth beyond the “wealth of the owner” is the wealth created for a new industry and, 
subsequently, the macro-economy. Ang points out that entrepreneurial firms’ projects may generate 
an aggregate positive net present value (NPV) at the industry/economy-level while remaining negative 
for an extended time for the firm owner. Ang identifies three corporate finance models for financing 
firm projects with no positive cash flow projected over multiple periods. One of these models 
addresses the government subsidizing innovation with useful indicators since the pending project will 
benefit the whole economy. Ang does challenge this model's effectiveness, suggesting its success will 
rely heavily on the experience of the government workers selecting the projects to receive funding. 
The second model uses the traditional sources of equity investors outside the entrepreneur's friends 
and family. The third model proposes a debt arrangement taken on by the entrepreneur that does not 
require any principal or interest payments for some extended time. Should the government guarantee 
debt for a project with a projected disproportional macro-economic payoff?  Maybe a fourth model 
should be added with combined aspects of the proposed models one and three with the government 
providing the guarantee for the entrepreneurial firm's debt. 
In a follow-up to its 2003 Small Business Survey, some Federal Reserve districts began in 2014 
conducting coordinated small business credit surveys. Since 2014 the Federal Reserve has been 
conducting annual Small Business Credit Survey (SBCS) and issuing reports. By the issuance of its 
2016 SBCS Report on Employer Firms in early 2017, the Federal Reserve had successfully coordinated 
the report between all twelve of its district banks. The 2016 report was the first report to collect 
consolidated data for personal guarantees and personal collateral. The 2016 SBCS Report on 
Employer Firms finds, “Personal assets and personal guarantees are commonly used to secure 
financing, even among larger firms.”  The 2017 report survey questionnaire separated the data 
elements of personal guarantees and personal assets. The 2020 SBCS Report on Employer Firms 
found, “a majority of firms with debt used a personal guarantee to secure their debt.”   
 
4.4 Recommendations for Future Research 
 
Research is needed to identify tactics that should be taken by incorporated small business 
owners to avoid providing personal guarantees while still obtaining required loans. Every business 
owner should have a strategy to maximize the owner's understanding and identification of all business 
risks. Additionally, an incorporated small business owner should minimize any risk to the lowest 
possible level for the selected project. Minimizing risk for a project needs to include avoiding the use 
of personal guarantees whenever possible. One research recommendation is that other ongoing small 
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business finance surveys incorporate the same or similar questions from this study. Other ongoing 
surveys include the Federal Reserve's ongoing previously mentioned efforts and the periodic survey 
accomplished by the National Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIB). The NFIB surveys are 
generally accomplished with the telephonic and written medium through the U.S. Postal Service and 
could yield different results based on the surveyor's opportunity to explain to the respondent what is 
meant by a personal guarantee. The data collected by the Federal Reserve through its annual Small 
Business Credit Surveys (SBCS) over the recent past years should aid researchers in better 
understanding debt in the small business environment.  
Future research of Question 8 of the survey choice of "Have this loan under other 
arrangements" could provide greater granularity of how some owners of incorporated small businesses 
are meeting their capital requirements. 
The low percentage (37%) of incorporated small businesses with a loan in 2014 indicates an 
underlying economic issue. Is the issuance of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act contributing to this under-
levered situation for incorporated small businesses?  By the issuance of the Dodd-Frank Act, has the 
government eliminated all potential bank failure to the point that it is decimating small business 
lending?  It is essential to focus on the relationship between Government (Federal, State, or 
Municipal), the lending institutions, and the entrepreneurs. There are links between each of the three 
entities that determine the risk each is willing to take. For example, due to the Great Recession, the 
Dodd-Frank Act has potentially placed restrictions on the lenders drawing funds through the Federal 
Reserve Discount Window. The Federal Government tightened requirements levied upon the lenders 
to reduce the risk of the occurrence of another Great Recession. The new requirements result in a 
change in the lenders' behavior as they adjust their operations to minimize their operational risk while 
maximizing their returns. This altered behavior by the lending institutions potentially led to a decrease 
in the percentage of incorporated small businesses with loans in 2014. While this study focused on 
personal guarantees, the low percentage of incorporated small businesses with loans in 2014 is a crucial 
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Appendix: Survey Instrument 
 
1.  Do you own or manage a small to medium-sized business (1-500 employees)? 
  ___ Yes 
  ___ No 
2.  What is the age of your business? 
  ___ Less than 3 years 
  ___ 3 - 5 years 
  ___ 6 - 10 years 
  ___ 11 - 20 years 
  ___ Greater than 20 years 
3.  What is the organizational form of your business? 
  ___ Sole Proprietorship 
      ___ Partnership 
  ___ Limited Liability Company (LLC) 
  ___ S-Corporation 
  ___ C-Corporation 
  ___ Other 
4.  Did your corporation have any loans during 2014, including any lines of credit that were in  
 place but may have not been used during 2014? 
  ___ Yes 
  ___ No 
5.  Is your business publicly traded? 
  ___ Yes 
  ___ No 
6.  Is your business involved with one or more of the following industries: Agriculture, forestry,  
 and fishing industry; Finance and insurance underwriting industry; and/or real estate  
 investment trusts industry? 
  ___ Yes 
  ___ No 
7. How many employees does your company currently have?  (please include full-time, part- 
 time, and any contracted employees) 
  ___ 1 to 9 employees  ___ 10 to 19 employees 
  ___ 20 to 49 employees ___ 50 to 250 employees 
  ___ 251 to 500 employees ___ 500+ employees 
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8. For loans in place during 2014, were business collateral and/or personal commitments 
(personal collateral or personal guarantee) pledged as security?  It is possible that both types 
of collateral (business and/or personal) and a guarantee could be required to secure a loan. 
Please indicate all that are applicable for each loan type listed below.  
 
Business collateral consists of assets such as real property, equipment, vehicles, etc. owned 
by the business. Personal collateral are asset(s), owned by an owner of the business, that 
have been pledged as security for a loan. A guarantee is a promise by a cosigner or a 
guarantor (usually a business owner) to satisfy (reimburse or repay the lender for) the loan if 
the business defaults (fails to repay the loan).  
 
For the corporation’s largest line of credit, which of the following was required? 
  ___ Business Collateral (Asset Owned by Your Corporation) 
  ___ Personal Collateral (Asset Owned by An Owner) 
  ___ Guarantee 
  ___ Have this loan under other arrangements 
  ___ Did not have this type of loan 
 For the corporation's largest mortgage, which of the following was required? 
  ___ Business Collateral (Asset Owned by Your Corporation) 
  ___ Personal Collateral (Asset Owned by An Owner) 
  ___ Guarantee 
  ___ Have this loan under other arrangements 
  ___ Did not have this type of loan 
 For the corporation's largest equipment loan, which of the following was required? 
  ___ Business Collateral (Asset Owned by Your Corporation) 
  ___ Personal Collateral (Asset Owned by An Owner) 
  ___ Guarantee 
  ___ Have this loan under other arrangements 
  ___ Did not have this type of loan 
 For the corporation's largest vehicle loan, which of the following was required? 
  ___ Business Collateral (Asset Owned by Your Corporation) 
  ___ Personal Collateral (Asset Owned by An Owner) 
  ___ Guarantee 
  ___ Have this loan under other arrangements 
  ___ Did not have this type of loan 
 For any other type of loan such as a loan from a minority shareholder or outside investor? 
  ___ Business Collateral (Asset Owned by Your Corporation) 
  ___ Personal Collateral (Asset Owned by An Owner) 
  ___ Guarantee 
  ___ Have this loan under other arrangements 
  ___ Did not have this type of loan 
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9. Did any of the loans in the above question require a guarantee? 
  ___ Yes 
  ___ No 
10. Please indicate below the source of the guarantee for each applicable loan type. It is possible 
that a guarantee for a loan can be required from more than one source. For example, a loan 
guaranteed by the United States Small Business Administration (SBA) currently requires all 
shareholders with more than 20% equity in a firm to provide a personal guarantee to support 
the loan the SBA is guaranteeing. Please indicate all applicable guarantee sources for each 
loan identified in Question 8 as requiring a guarantee. 
 For the corporation’s largest line of credit, which of the following was required? 
  ___ Guarantee provided by the Owners 
  ___ Guarantee provided by other individuals or business firms 
  ___ Guarantee provided by the Small Business Administration (SBA) 
  ___ Guarantee provided by a State Government 
  ___ Guarantee provided by some other source 
  ___ Did not have this type of loan 
 For the corporation's largest mortgage, which of the following was required? 
  ___ Guarantee provided by the Owners 
  ___ Guarantee provided by other individuals or business firms 
  ___ Guarantee provided by the Small Business Administration (SBA) 
  ___ Guarantee provided by a State Government 
  ___ Guarantee provided by some other source 
  ___ Did not have this type of loan 
 For the corporation's largest equipment loan, which of the following was required? 
  ___ Guarantee provided by the Owners 
  ___ Guarantee provided by other individuals or business firms 
  ___ Guarantee provided by the Small Business Administration (SBA) 
  ___ Guarantee provided by a State Government 
  ___ Guarantee provided by some other source 
  ___ Did not have this type of loan 
 For the corporation's largest vehicle loan, which of the following was required? 
  ___ Guarantee provided by the Owners 
  ___ Guarantee provided by other individuals or business firms 
  ___ Guarantee provided by the Small Business Administration (SBA) 
  ___ Guarantee provided by a State Government 
  ___ Guarantee provided by some other source 
  ___ Did not have this type of loan 
 For any other loan the corporation may have that does not fall into one of the other four  
 loan types? 
  ___ Guarantee provided by the Owners 
  ___ Guarantee provided by other individuals or business firms 
  ___ Guarantee provided by the Small Business Administration (SBA) 
  ___ Guarantee provided by a State Government 
  ___ Guarantee provided by some other source 
  ___ Did not have this type of loan 
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11. Since 2008, has your corporation decided not to undertake a positive investment opportunity 
(positive net present value project), because the lender required a personal guarantee to 
obtain a loan for the project? 
  ___ Yes 
  ___ No 
  ___ Don’t Know 
12. Since 2008, has your corporation been declined (denied) a loan because of your inability to  
 meet the lender’s personal guarantee requirements?  
  ___ Yes 
  ___ No 
  ___ Don’t Know 
13. Since 2008, has your corporation been declined (denied) credit because a minority  
 shareholder refused to provide a personal guarantee? 
   ___ Yes 
  ___ No 
  ___ Don’t Know 
14. What was the impact of the lender’s personal guarantee requirement and your inability to  
 meet it, or your decision to not meet it?  Please select all responses that are applicable. 
_____ Had to forgo an expansion project 
_____ Could not hire additional staff 
_____ Had to lay off staff 
_____ Could not pursue new products or services 
_____ Could not fulfill an order or contract 
_____ Had to seek funding elsewhere 
_____ No impact 
15. Since 2008, have you refused to provide a personal guarantee in order to obtain a loan?  
  ___ Yes 
  ___ No 
  ___ Don’t Know 
16. If you answered “yes” to Question 15, did your corporation still receive credit or a loan from  
 the individual lender after you refused to provide a personal guarantee?  
  ___ Yes 
  ___ No 
  ___ Don’t Know 
17. Which of the following describes your business’s annual revenue? 
  ___ Less than $250,000 
  ___ $250,000, - $500,000 
  ___ $500,000, - $1,000,000 
  ___ $1,000,000, - $5,000,000 
  ___ Greater than $5,000,000 
18. What is your age? 
  ___<18  ___18 - 29  
  ___30 - 44 ___45 – 59  
  ___60+ 
19. What is your gender? 
  ___ Female 
  ___ Male 
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20. How much total combined income did all members of your household earn last year? 
  ___ 0 - $9,999 
  ___ $10,000 - $24,999 
  ___ $25,000 - $49,999 
  ___ $50,000 - $74,999 
  ___ $75,000 - $99,999 
  ___ $100,000 - $124,999 
  ___ $125,000 - $149,999 
  ___ $150,000 - $174,999 
  ___ $175,000 - $199,999 
  ___ $200,000 and up 
21. U.S. Region? 
  ___ New England 
  ___ Middle Atlantic 
  ___ East North Central 
  ___ West North Central 
  ___ South Atlantic 
  ___ East South Central 
  ___ West South Central 
  ___ Mountain 
  ___ Pacific 
